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grounded in the Constitution so that judges do not become indistin-
guishable from legislators, thereby undermining the legitimacy of, 
and public respect for, the Court. 
Unavoidably, the Supreme Court is a political institution. The 
Constitution points to broad objects which cannot be adequately 
encompassed within a legalistic-historic formulation such as the 
search for original intention. Nor does the Constitution make an 
exception of the Supreme Court: as with the other two branches, its 
independence can and should be politically restrained by the other 
branches. As Tocqueville noted, in America Supreme Court judges 
must be statesmen. But they must also be judges, whose training 
and important, but not exclusive, responsibility for interpreting the 
Constitution make their work significantly different from that of the 
other two branches. 
Thus the most significant task for scholarship on the Court is, 
it seems to me, to articulate an alternative jurisprudence to the too 
narrow, restrictive view of the interpretivists and the open-ended, 
unrestrained approach of the non-interpretivists. Such a jurispru-
dence would be grounded in a sufficiently broad understanding of 
constitutionality to allow the Court ample scope for protecting lib-
erty. At the same time, it would be informed by the broad clauses 
and objects of the Constitution and the political thought which sup-
ports it, including the recognition that the Supreme Court itself em-
bodies, while it is also responsible for helping to resolve, the 
inherent tension in a liberal democracy between popular govern-
ment and liberty. 
DANIEL A. F ARBER36 
While there are exceptions, most of the major scholarship in 
the past ten years has focused on constitutional theory. We have 
seen endless debates about the role of text, original intent, and polit-
ical philosophy in constitutional law. Yet we seem to have learned 
little that is new about how to decide constitutional issues. 
The originalism debate is a good example. The originalist view 
is supposedly that the meaning of the Constitution is completely 
determined by the views of its framers. It is relatively easy to show 
that if "original intent" is supposed to be a matter of historical fact, 
it is difficult to define its meaning, ascertain its content, or explain 
why it should be determinative. (The basic error, of course, is tak-
ing "the consent of the governed" to be a matter of simple historical 
36. Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Visiting Professor of 
Law, Stanford University. 
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fact.) It is almost as easy to show the absurdity of ignoring histori-
cal understandings altogether, as if we had all awakened one morn-
ing to find that our government was controlled by a piece of 
parchment in the National Archives. 
Of course, nobody sensible takes either of these extreme posi-
tions. Reasonable people agree that historical intent informs but 
does not always control interpretation-the real dispute is about 
matters of degree rather than pristine theory. Similarly, not even 
the strongest believers in original intent completely reject the idea of 
the "living constitution"; even Raoul Berger accepts Brown and 
Richard Epstein is willing to live with the Social Security Act-
which goes to show that even the most doctrinaire scholars must at 
some point recognize historical and political realities. 
Ultimately, most of the debate involves how creative judges 
should be in constitutional cases. Theorists have staked out some 
untenable extreme positions, but the real question is one of degree: 
not whether judges should be creative, but how often and how 
much. Questions of degree tend to be messy and contextual, while 
theorists thrive on order, elegance, and universality. Yet the ques-
tion of how courts should decide constitutional cases may be no 
more amenable to grand theory than the question of how to paint a 
good picture. 
In our fascination with the Big Think theory, we have over-
looked some other very interesting problems. To begin with, we 
have given scant attention to much of the Supreme Court's work. 
The Court has been doing odd and intriguing things in equal protec-
tion cases, for example, but no one seems much interested. Appar-
ently, analysis of the Court's decisions has come to seem unbearably 
pedestrian to many law professors. 
Second, we have slighted the policy issues in constitutional 
law. For example, some very respectable economists believe that 
affirmative action in employment either has done nothing to help 
blacks or has actually hurt them. In all the law review discussions 
of the legality of affirmative action, it is hard to find a serious dis-
cussion of its desirability. Similarly, we find little discussion of the 
practical effects of busing, or liberalized abortion, or a dozen other 
major constitutional issues. 
Third, our obsession with constitutional theory has tended to 
emphasize the uniqueness of federal constitutional law. So we have 
paid little attention to state constitutional law, or even more impor-
tantly, the developing body of constitutional law elsewhere in the 
world. From all the discussions about judicial legitimacy, you 
would think judicial review was a unique aberration, requiring spe-
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cial justification. It would probably be more accurate to say that 
some form of judicial review is now the norm in democracies. 
There are a lot of interesting things for constitutional scholars 
to look into. Unfortunately (given its prominence in recent years), 
grand theory doesn't seem to be one of them. 
DAVID P. BRYDEN37 
The other day I received, as an alumnus, a message from Dean 
Vorenberg of Harvard Law School. Listing some of the school's 
achievements, he related that Harvard now has "13 courses and 
seminars in constitutional law, in addition to five sections of the 
basic 'second-year' course," plus "six courses in the field of interna-
tional human rights." If this issue of Constitutional Commentary 
survives until the twenty-fifth century, I suspect that the dean's rev-
elation will be interesting to students of twentieth-century Ameri-
can culture. 
As Americans, as lawyers, and as constitutional scholars, we 
take rights very seriously indeed. In a citizen this is sometimes a 
virtue, but in a scholar it is more often a vice. Many of our readers 
have never studied the history of liberty except in a constitutional 
law course. For this and other reasons, they are in perpetual danger 
of equating the progress of liberty with the progress of law, and the 
progress of law with the progress of constitutional rights. 
We begin with cases; almost inevitably we often treat doctrine 
as an end in itself, a tendency that is reinforced by normal human 
laziness as well as the quest for maximum scholarly output. 
Although we know better, we habitually imply-if only by our si-
lence-that if the Court hadn't acted nothing would have been 
done about a problem, and that the Court's decision had important 
consequences. Prior to Muller, we imply, working hours were not 
growing shorter except under statutory compulsion; after Muller, 
our readers are left to infer, the problem was solved. Miranda, we 
presume, created dramatic new realities in the interrogation room. 
Griswold, some imply, was a landmark in the evolution of sexual 
liberty; I doubt that most law students could even begin to describe 
the origins-mostly non-legal-of privacy in the home. Roe was 
necessary, says popular mythology, because legislatures weren't re-
forming abortion laws; and if it is overruled abortion "will be ille-
gal." Such assumptions are often half-truths at best. Left 
unchallenged, they fortify the American tendency to over-glorify 
37. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
